Tax Consequences of Joint Ownership of Property by Stacy, Charles B.
Volume 61 | Issue 3 Article 2
April 1959
Tax Consequences of Joint Ownership of Property
Charles B. Stacy
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles B. Stacy, Tax Consequences of Joint Ownership of Property, 61 W. Va. L. Rev. (1959).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 61 April, 1959 Number 3
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
JOINT OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
Ca~Anrs B. STACY*
T HE almost overwhelming trend in recent years toward the use
of various forms of joint ownership' of property, particularly by
husband and wife, is indicative of a widespread failure to realize
all the implications of such title-holding devices. A companion
article2 has outlined the general legal attributes of the common
forms of joint ownership. However, because the growth in the use
of joint tenancy and its kindred has coincided with an increase in
the impact of income and death taxes,3 it has become important
also to understand the results of employing these devices in the
context of taxation. It is the purpose of this article to point out
some of the problems which arise under the federal gift, estate and
income taxes, and under the West Virginia inheritance and transfer
tax as a result of the use of joint estates in real and personal property.
o Member of the Kanawha County Bar.
The terms "joint estates" and "Joint ownership" as used in this article are
intended to include all forms of ownership by which two or more persons
possess concurrent interests in property. As employed in this article, the termjoint tenancy will often be used to include tenancy by the entirety, but is
ordinarily used in the common law sense to describe a joint estate in which
the surviving co-owner takes the whole estate.2 Merricks, Joint Estates in Real Property in West Virginia, 61 W. VA. L.
REv. 101 (1959).
S Not only have the rates of these taxes remained relatively fixed for some
years, but the basic exemptions have not been increased despite continued
inflation; as a result income, estate, inheritance and gift taxes have become
important to many individuals who would not have been materially affected by
them twenty years ago.
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I. FE L& G=r TAX
The federal gift tax4 applies generally to all transfers of prop-
erty by gift. Its principal purpose is to curtail avoidance of the
federal estate tax by the making of substantial lifetime gifts of
property.5 The law provides for an exclusion of the first $3,000
in value of gifts to each donee in any calendar year, and an overall
lifetime exemption of $30,000 for gifts in excess of annual exclusions.6
A. Application to joint estates
Until the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
there was no specific mention in the law of the applicability of the
gift tax to the creation of joint estates of various kinds.7 However,
it was contended from the first that the tax applied to the creation
of all joint estates where the co-owner received an interest in prop-
erty without adequate consideration.8
Basic principles in this area have been settled in judicial con-
troversies arising out of the creation of tenancies by the entirety.
Immediately upon the enactment of the new gift tax, the govern-
ment attempted to impose the tax upon the conveyance of property
to husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, where the entire
consideration was paid by or the property originally belonged to
the husband. At first the Board of Tax Appeals accepted the tax-
payers' argument that there was not a sufficient transfer of rights
in the property to the wife to sustain imposition of the tax, in the
absence of a clear indication of congressional intent.9  However,
these decisions were quickly reversed, and the courts have long
agreed unanimously that there is a sufficient transfer of rights to
support the tax.10
Another argument advanced on behalf of the taxpayer and
rejected in these cases, equally applicable to joint tenancies, was
that as the whole property was includable in the husband's estate
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § § 2501-2524.
5 PAUL, FEDRAL ESTATE AND Gnr TAXATION § 15.05 (1942).6 INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2503(b), 2521; the exclusion does not
apply to a gift of a "future interest, generally an interest which does not
begin in enjoyment until a future time.
7 The .federal gift tax was first introduced in 1924 (Revenue Act of 1924,
§§ 319-324), and abandoned in 1926 (Revenue Act of 1926, § 1200(a)); it
was reenacted in 1932 (Revenue Act of 1932, §§ 501-532).
8 Inclusion was contended for under the broad language imposing the tax
upon "the transfer ... of property by gift." Revenue Act of 1932, § 501(a);
INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 1000(a).9 See, for instance, William H. Hart, 36 B.T.A. 1207 (1937).
10 Lilly v. Smith, 96 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 604
(1938); Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939); Commissioner v.
Logan, 109 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1940); J. C. Gutman, 41 B.T.A. 816 (1940).
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at his death, for federal estate tax purposes, 1 Congress should not
be assumed to have intended the gift tax to apply to the creation
of the tenancy. But the courts have not accepted the argument
for mutual consistency between the estate and gift taxes, and it
has been noted in rejecting this argument that the estate tax provides
a credit for gift taxes paid with regard to property included in
the taxable estate.'2
B. Value of gift
Upon the creation of a tenancy in common between A and B,
where the entire consideration is paid by A, there is clearly a gift
from A to B of a fractional undivided interest in the property; that
this constitutes a taxable gift has apparently never been ques-
tioned.' 3 Similarly, upon the transfer by A of property to A and B
as joint tenants, A has made a taxable gift of one-half the value of
the property to B,14 as the joint tenancy gives B an effective half
interest subject only to A's right of survivorship, which may be
destroyed by B.
The value of the gift made as the result of the creation of a
tenancy by the entirety depends upon the respective rights of the
co-owners under state law.15 Ordinarily, neither the husband nor
the wife can convey his or her interest separately or destroy the
right of survivorship; thus the total value of the rights of either
will depend upon the life expectancy of each co-owner and the
11 Infra, Part II of this article.
12 Lilly v. Smith, 96 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 805 U.S. 604
(1988); J. C. Gutman, 41 B.T.A. 816 (1940). In Commissioner v. Hart, 106
F.2d 269 (8d Cir. 1939), the court took note of the fact that if the wife died
first there would be no credit. Another argument advanced by the taxpayers
in the Lilly and Gutman cases, and rejected, was that no gift was intended,
but that the husband was merely fulfilling his obligation to furnish a residence
for his family.13See, for instance, Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958): "If a donor
transfers by gift less than his entire interest in property, the gift tax is applicable
to the interest transferred. The tax is applicable, for example, to the transfer
of an undivided half interest in property ...."
14 Under the usual rules governing the rights of joint tenants, each of two
cotenants is entitled to receive one-half the income, and either may dispose of
his interest at any time and may destroy the right of survivorship inherent in
the original estate. Accordingly, if A purchases property in the names of A
and B as joint tenants, he makes a gift to B equal to one-half the value of the
property. Treas. Beg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958); Treas. Beg. 108, §
86.2(a)(5) (1949).
15 In Hopkins v. Magruder, 122 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1941), property be-
longing to the husband was conveyed to husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety; the husband argued that the value for gift tax purposes should be
reduced by the wife's prior dower interest in the property, but the court held
that on the facts no dower interest existed. It has been held generally for gift
tax purposes that the inchoate dower or curtesy of a spouse will not be recog-
nized. Correlia Mason Thompson, 37 B.T.A. 793 (1938).
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chance that each will survive the other.16 The Treasury Department
has long taken the position that these rights are capable of valuation
for gift tax purposes under accepted actuarial principles. Although
in an individual case the value thus computed will not be accurate,
because dependent on tables based on average life expectancy,
actuarial valuation for gift tax purposes in cases of tenancies by
the entirety has been accepted by the courts.17
Other types of joint interests, such as joint life estates, are also
valued on actuarial principles.' 8
C. Joint tenancy of husband and wife in real property under
Internal Revenue Code of 1954
Any transfer of property to joint tenants or tenants by the
entirety prior to January 1, 1955, resulted in a gift subject to the
gift tax. In considering revision of the law in 1954, Congress recog-
nized the widespread ignorance of this fact, and, presumably, the
impracticability of enforcing the tax in the majority of cases. 19 The
1954 Code20 provides that in the case of a creation of a tenancy
by the entirety or a joint tenancy between husband and wife in
real property2l no taxable gift shall be considered to be made unless
the donor elects to have the transaction subjected to the gift tax.
The election is made by filing a timely gift tax return for the
calendar year in which the gift is made. The return must be filed
in order to make the election effective regardless of whether there
will be any tax due.22 In the common case of a residence purchased
in installments by the husband in the name of himself and his wife
as joint tenants or as tenants by the entirety, ati election will be
open to the husband for each year in which payments are made,
16 Value will depend also on the income during their joint lives. In most
states where the estate is recognized, the income belongs half to each; how-
ever, in some states the husband is entitled to receive all the income. See Part
III, infra; Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(c) (1958).17 Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939); J. C. Gutman,
41 B.T.A. 816 (1940); the measure of the tax is "the value of such prop-
erty less the present worth of the right of the husband to the income
or other enjoyment of the property, or share thereof, during the joint
lives of the spouses, and the present worth of his right to the whole of
the property should he survive his wife." AcTuruAL VALUES FoR ESTATE AND
GIrT TAx, I.R.S. Publication No. 11 (1955), 24; Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2
(1958); Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19(h) (1949).
.
8 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(e) (1958).
19 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 94, A323 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 128, 480 (1954).
20 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515.
21 The provision does not apply to personal property.
22 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(c).
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and a gift tax return will have to be filed for each year if the husband
wishes to elect to make a gift each time.2 3
The Code provides that if an election is not made, then a gift
will be deemed to be made at the "termination" of the tenancy,
"to the extent that the proportion of the total consideration furnished
by each spouse multiplied by the proceeds of such termination
(whether in the form of cash, property, or interests in property)
exceeds the value of such proceeds of termination received by such
spouse."2 There is no. "termination" for this purpose upon the
death of a spouse. The Code is otherwise silent as to what shall
constitute a "termination".
One of the situations which has been of particular concern
since the enactment of the new law is that of the sale by the husband
and wife of their jointly owned residence, and reinvestment of the
proceeds in another property. The Treasury Department regulations
answer this problem by assuming no gift if the proceeds of sale of
the old property are not divided, but are reinvested in another
property within a reasonable time.25 Another problem involves a
determination of the proceeds "received" by each spouse upon
termination by sale.26 Other questions may be anticipated under
this new provision, some of which are dealt with by the regulations.
D. Joint estates in personal property
The rules outlined above apply equally to real and personal
property. However, additional problems arise in some instances
in connection with devices for joint ownership of personal property,
because of the nature of the property or the relatively informal
methods of dealing with it.
For instance, the deposit of funds by A to the account of "A or
B" offers no objective test of ownership of the funds. Whether this
creates a "joint tenancy", with all the implications of that term,
or whether different rights of some kind, or no rights at all accrue
to B, as against A, as the result of such a deposit has been the source
28 Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2 (1958).
24 INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2515(b).25 Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d) (2) (1958), requires that there be no divi-
sion of the proceeds, that the spouses enter into a contract to purchase other
property on or before the due date of the gift tax return for the year in which
the old property is sold, and that within a reasonable time thereafter they pur-
chase such other property and hold it in a tenancy identical to that in which
they held the original property.26 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d) (3) (1958).
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of a considerable amount of litigation.27 The Treasury Depart-
ment's position with regard to joint accounts has been that a gift
occurs when the depositor, A, allows B to withdraw the funds for
his own benefit.28
Likewise, bonds purchased by A in "A or B" form are con-
sidered subject to the gift tax only when B is allowed to redeem
them and retain the proceeds.2 9 Actual ownership of bonds and
other securities may in some instances, however, be in one other
than the registered owner or owners.8 0
E. Gift tax marital deduction
For the purpose of computing the amount of gifts subject to
the gift tax, a deduction is allowed in the amount of one-half the
value of property given to the donor's spouse.8 ' The deduction is
not allowed where the interest transferred to the spouse "will termi-
nate or fail" under certain conditions, and ordinarily is not available
where, as in the case of joint tenancies, the property will revert to
the husband or to some other person if the wife predeceases him.8 2
However, it is provided that inthe case of creation of a joint tenancy
or tenancy by the entirety, where there are no other co-owners
except husband and wife, the deduction will be allowed. 8  Thus
a husband may create a joint tenancy with his wife in property
27 See Annot., 149 A.L.R. 879 (1944), supplementing numerous prior
annotations. Lett v. Twentieth Street Bank, 138 W. Va. 759, 77 S.E.2d 813(1958), held that by reason of W. VA. CODE c. 31, art 8, § 23 (Michie 1955),
a "joint tenancy" exists in an account in "or" form.28 Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(a)(4) (1949); Treas. Beg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4)(1958).
29 Min. 5202, 1941-2 Cum. BUL. 241; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4)
(1958). Pursuant to Min. 5202, purchase by A of bonds in name of "A pay-
able on death to B" does not constitute a taxable gift.
30 TeTreasury Department has taken the position that government regu-
lations with regard to savings bonds and the registration of such bonds are
controlling on the question of ownership. For cases on savings bonds see
Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 788 (1955); and see Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2a 731
(3d Cir. 1958). An illustration of the problems of donative intent and actual
ownership of securities is Charles Guzy, 8 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 681 (1949),
where the husband bought securities for himself and his wife by the entireties,
sold them, deposited the proceeds in a joint account, then transferred them to a
separate account. It was held that the purchase of the securities resulted in a
taxable gift to the wife.31 INr. RLv. CODE OF 1954, § 2523(a), as limited by § 2524.
32.1d. § 2523(b).
331d. § 2523(d); Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(d)-i (1958), provides that the
deduction shall be one-half the value of the interest in property passing to the
donee spouse. Of course, if A transfers propert to A, B and C as joint tenants,
the interest of B (A's wife) will be terminated by her death prior to either A
or C, and the marital deduction is not allowed. Rev. Rul. 54-410, 1954-2
Cum. BULL. 321, provides that the deduction will not be allowed where A
purchases bonds in the name of "B, payable on death to A."
6
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worth up to $12,000 without utilizing any part of his $30,000 lifetime
exemption, and, using the full amount of the lifetime exemption,
may create a joint tenancy with his wife in property worth up to
$132,000 without payment of any gift tax. However, a gift tax
return must be filed for any year in which the gross value of gifts
to any person exceeds $8,000, regardless of the marital deduction
and lifetime exemption, and regardless of whether any tax is due.
34
II. FEDEBAL ESTATE TAX
The federal estate tax8 5 is imposed upon the "gross estate,"
as defined for estate tax purposes, 3 6 of a decedent, at rates varying
from 3% to 77% of the "taxable estate."3 7 In the computation of
the taxable estate deductions are allowed for debts of the decedent,
funeral expenses and costs of administration of the estate.38 A spe-
cific exemption is allowed to all estates in the amount of $60,000,39
so that if the gross estate does not exceed that figure, plus the debts
and expenses, there will be no tax, although a return must be filed
if the gross estate exceeds the $60,000 figure.40 A deduction is al-
lowed up to one-half of the "adjusted gross estate" 4 1 for property
included in the gross estate which passes to the decedent's spouse.
The application of the estate tax to each of the various types
of joint ownership in property depends upon the nature of the
property interests involved and upon specific provisions of law.
Fractional undivided interests in property held in common are
includable in the gross estate of a decedent under the general pro-
visions of law.42 Other types of ownership, such as joint life estates
or joint interests in trusts, are discussed hereinafter. 43
The federal estate tax provisions have since 1916 contained
a specific reference to the inclusion of property held jointly with
right of survivorship.4 4 The present section of the law,45 which
has remained substantially unchanged for many years, states the
general rule that the whole value of the property, and not just a
3 4 INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, § 6019.
35 Id. §§ 2001-2106.
36 Id. § 2031.
37 Id. § 2001.
38 Id. § § 2051-2056.
39 Id. § 2052.
40 Id. § 6018.
4 1 In the usual case, the gross estate less debts, funeral expenses and costs
of administration; INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 2156(c).
42 Id. § 2033; Harvey v. United States, 185 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950).4 3 Part IEB of this article, infra.4 4 Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(c).
45 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
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fractional part, will be included in the estate of the co-owner who
dies first, except to the extent that it can be proved that the sur-
vivor contributed to the purchase price of the property. This rule
does not apply, of course, where the property was acquired by the
decedent and his co-owner by gift, devise or inheritance from some
other person, in which case only the decedent's fractional interest
in the property will be included in his estate for estate tax purposes,
as in the case of property owned in common.46
The validity of the inclusion in the measure of the estate tax
of the entire property, where the decedent has, according to rules
of property law, a lesser interest, was attacked by taxpayers on
constitutional grounds at an early date, but the courts have found
a sufficient transfer of property rights by reason of the death of a
co-owner to justify the imposition of the tax.47 It is also settled that
the whole property is includable in the gross estate without regard
to when it was acquired or when ihe joint estate was created, as
against the contention of taxpayers that the provision is unconsti-
tutionally retroactive when applied to joint estates created prior
to the enactment of the law. 48
A. Problems where survivor has provided part of consideration for
purchase of property
1. Computation of amount includable where there is a con-
tribution by the survivor. Where it has been shown that the survivor
contributed a portion of the purchase price of property held in joint
tenancy out of his own funds, the amount includable in the estate
of the decedent is that proportion of the value of the whole property
which the amount of the decedent's contribution bears to the total
purchase price of the property.49 For instance, if it can be shown
46 Ibid.
47 Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503-504 (1930): "Before the
death of the husband... the wife had the right to possess and use the whole
property, but so, also, had her husband; she could not dispose of the property
except with her husband's concurrence; but her rights were hedged about at
all points by the equal rights of her husband. At his death, however, and
because of it, she, for the first time, became entitled to exclusive possession, use
and enjoyment; she ceased to hold the property subject to qualifications im-posed by the law relating to tenancy by the entirety, and became entitled to
hold and enjoy it absolutely as her own; and then, and then only, she acquired
the power, not theretofore possessed, of disposing of the property by an exercise
of her sole will. Thus the death of one of the parties to the tenancy became
the 'generaing source' of important and definite accessions to the property
rights of the other."48 Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 224 (1982); Griswold v. Helvering,290 U.S. 56 (1988); United States v. Jacobs, 806 U.S. 868 (1988).49INr. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2020, states the proportion in terms of thepart of the total value of the property which is to be excluded from the dece-
dents estate; the stated interpretation is apparently universally agreed upon,
in spite of the possible alternative construction.
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that the survivor furnished $5,000 out of a total of $20,000 paid for
property with a total value for estate tax purposes of $30,000, $7,500
would be included in the decedents gross estate.
2. Original source of funds. The statute contains a specific
requirement that one must look further than the transaction in
which the particular property owned at the decedent's death was
purchased, in order to determine whether the survivor has con-
tributed to the purchase price.50 To satisfy this requirement, the
original source of the funds used to purchase property held in joint
tenancy at the death of the decedent must be determined to have
been someone other than the decedent. For example, where a wife
contributes half the purchase price of the property out of cash or
the proceeds of sale of other property previously given her by her
husband, the whole of the property is includable in the husband's
estate for estate tax purposes, because the original source of the
funds contributed by the wife in connection with the transaction
was the husband.51
3. Proof of contribution by survivor. The burden of proof is
on the decedent's estate to show that the survivor contributed any
part of the purchase price of property held in joint tenancy.52 This
burden in many cases presents insurmountable obstacles to the
decedent's executor, and it may be offered as one of the principal
objections to the use of the joint tenancy device in any case where
more than one co-owner contributes to the purchase price of joint
property.
One question on which the decisions are divided is whether it
is necessary to "trace specific funds through bank accounts and
other properties in order to identify them as contributions of the
GOld. § 2040: ". ... originally belonged to such other person and never to
have been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an
adequate or full consideration in money or money's worth ...."51 United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1938); Stuart v. Hasset, 41 F.
Supp. 905 (D.C. Mass. 1941); Estate of Edward T. Kelley, 22 B.T.A. 421(1931), acq., X-2 Cu .Bu... 37 (1931); Elizabeth F. Bowditch, 23 B.T.A.
1266 (1931); Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c (4) (1958); McCrady v. Heiner,
19 F. Supp. 575 (D.C. Pa. 1937), contra, before the decision in Jacobs, supra.52 Foster v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 618 (1938); Fox v. Rothensies, 115
F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1940); McGrew's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 158(6th Cir. 1943); Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934);
Henry M. Butzel, 21 B.T.A. 188 (1930); City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 41
B.T.A. 1 (1940); Estate of Jesse E. Rogers, 1941 P-H B.T.A. MEm. DEC.
41,077- Estate of Elwood Mead, 1942 P-H B.T.A. MEMv. DEC. ff 42,236;
Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943); Estate of Joseph H. Heidt,
8 T.C. 969 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 170 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1948); Estate of
Harold Loveland, 13 T.C. 5 (1949); Estate of Thomas R. Tennant, 8 CCH
TAx CT. Mamn. 143 (1949); Estate of Arthur J. Brandt, 8 CCH TAx CT.
Mas. 820 (1949); Estate of Joseph J. Mulconroy, T.C. Mem. 1956-170, 15
CCH TAx CT. MEM. 887 (1956).
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survivor, or whether the burden of proof is satisfied by evidence
that a certain amount of money was derived from the survivor's
separate property or was received by the survivor as a bequest or
inheritance, and that the parties intended to apply or considered
that they were applying such funds to the purchase of jointly held
property. Some courts have taken the position that funds originally
belonging to the survivor must be traced with some degree of cer-
tainty through joint and separate bank accounts and properties held
in various names, in order to support the burden of proving con-
tributioLs by the survivor.53 Other courts have held that exact
tracing is not necessary and have made an estimate of the survivor's
contribution from all the evidence, where satisfied that some part
of the consideration has derived from the survivor.54 The litigated
cases show in many instances the impossibility of proving the origi-
nal source of funds used to purchase joint tenancy property where
such proof involves a series of purchases and sales and deposits and
withdrawals over a period of years. 55
4. What constitutes consideration. The common sources from
which wives provide consideration for the purchase of jointly held
property are inheritances, gifts and bequests from parents, and
5 3 Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934) (wife original-
ly made contribution to purchase, but disposition of proceeds of sale not shown);
Estate of Elwood Mead, supra note 52 (amounts deposited in joint account by
wife, but no proof of disposition); Estate of Joseph H. Heidt, supra note 52(original contribution by wife, but not traced); Estate of Thomas R. Tennant
supra note 52 (wife had inherited income producing property, but no proof of
disposition of separate income deposited in joint account). Cf. Estate of Arthur
J. Brandt, supra note 52 (where the court analyzed deposits and withdrawals
from a joint account for a period of six months before the decedents death to
determine the portion of the account includable in the husband's estate, as-
suning for lack of evidence to the contrary that the balance at the beginning
of the period was all the husbands).
54 Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935) (exact tracing
not necessary and one-half held contributed by wife); Estate of Louis Bendet,
5 CCH TAx CT. ME~m. 802 (1946); Estate of Ralph Owen Howard 9 T.C. 1192(1947) (analysis of joint accounts for deposits, but no precise an,lysis required
of withdrawals); Estate of William E. Thompson, 7 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 142(1948) (Cohan rule applied where total deposits by each spouse in separate
accounts of husband shown); Estate of Mary Louise Selecman, 9 CCH TAX
CT. Mms. 997 (1950) (Cohan rule applied to determine contributions by wife
where husband was survivor).
55 Cf. Fox v. Rothensies 115 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1940), and Estate of Joseph
H. Heidt, 8 T.C. 969 (1947), 170 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1948), where the court
commented as follows: "The question resolves itself into one of fact and the
evidence before us is, in the most part, very unsatisfactory. This situation is
due primarily to the fact that the principal witness was somewhat advanced in
years and the transactions involved covered a period of almost 50 years, a situa-
tion which would tax the memory of any witness." The wisdom of depositing
income from separate or jointly owned income producing property in a separate
account should be obvious. See Drummond's Estate v. Paschl, 75 F. Supp.
46 (D.C. Ark. 1947); Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943).
10
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separately earned income. In such cases the problem is usually
one of proof.
In a number of litigated cases the surviving wife has success-
fully contended that only one-half of the property held in joint
tenancy by herself and her husband was includable in the husband's
estate because of a prior agreement between them that they would
conduct their affairs on the basis of an equal partnership; that they
would share the profits from the family business; or that all earnings
and separately owned property of both would be owned jointly.56
However, where no such prior agreement is proved, or where the
services of the wife are of the sort usually rendered in a marriage,
no consideration has been found passing from the wife, and the
whole value of joint tenancy property has been included in the hus-
band's estate.5 7
Presumptions or rules under state law may also be important in
determining property ownership or contribution by a wife.5 8
A common situation is the purchase of property as joint tenants
partly through payment of a mortgage out of the income from either
the same or other jointly owned property. Under the laws of most
56Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Berkowitz v.
Commissioner, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Rogan v. Kammerdiner, 140 F.2d
569 (9th Cir. 1944); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952);
United States v. Neel, 285 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956); Estate of Joseph G.
Giuliani, 11 CCC TAx CT. MEm. 673 (1952); Estate of Charles A. Trafton,
27 T.C. 610 (1956), acq., 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 7.57 Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Estate of
Jesse E. Rogers, 1941 P-H B.T.A. Mzvr. DEC. 1 41,077; Estate of Joseph A.
Brudermann, 10 T.C. 560 (1948); Estate of Harold Loveland, 13 T.C. 5(1949). A property settlement in which the wife agreed to continue the mar-
riage and to relinquish her marital rights in the husband's estate in return for
transfer of certain property of the husband to husband and wife as joint tenants,
was found not to be consideration for estate tax purposes, and the whole prop-
erty was included in the husband's estate, in Sheets v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d
727 (8th Cir. 1938).
5 Cf. Bushman v. United States, supra note 57; Fox v. Rothensies, 115 F.
2d 42 (3d Cir. 1940) (payment by the wife out of her separate property of
family expenses would not be presumed to be a loan under state law (Pa.)
so as to characterize a later transfer of property by the husband to a joint
tenancy as repayment for consideration); Henry M. Butzel, 21 B.T.A. 188(1930) (executor argued without success that under Michigan law tenants
by the entirety were presumed to have contributed equally to the purchase, it
being held that a rule of state property law was not sufficient to satisfy the
burden of proof with regard to consideration for purposes of the federal
estate tax. Community property rules do not have the effect of attribut-
ing half the consideration to the wife); Steen v. United States, 195 F.2d
379 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952); Brockway's Estate v.
Commissioner, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954). In City Bank Farmer's Trust Co.,
41 B.T.A. 1 (1940), husband and wife died in a common disaster, and the
husband's executor argued for inclusion of only one-half of jointly held prop-
erty in the husbands estate because of the New York law providing that in
such a situation one-half should descend as property of each co-owner; how-
ever, this was held not to control for estate tax purposes, and the whole prop-
erty was included in the husband's estate for lack of proof.
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states income from jointly owned property belongs equally to the co-
tenants.59 Therefore, if it can be shown that real estate rentals from
jointly owned property were in fact applied to the payment of a
mortgage on such property, then one-half of such rentals so applied
will be attributable to each of two co-tenants, despite the fact that
the original consideration for the purchase of the property came from
the husband.60
A similar question arises when one joint tenant dies after a series
of transactions in which jointly owned property is purchased, sold at
a profit, and the proceeds reinvested in other property held in joint
tenancy. Does one-half of the gain inure to each of the two joint
tenants and does the one who made no original contribution there-
after get credit for contribution to the extent of one-half of the gain?
The answer to this question should be affirmative, if the parties have
in fact treated the proceeds of sale as belonging one-half to each,
and the funds can be traced adequately; the decisions which have
considered the matter agree that the noncontributing owner gets
credit for these gains.6 '
A more difficult problem is whether the existence at the death
of one co-owner of a mortgage on jointly held property on which
both co-owners are liable constitutes a "contribution" by the sur-
vivor. Oddly, there appears to be little authority on this question.
The single decision62 is confused, apparently allowing not only an
exclusion for a proportion of the value of the property based on the
wife's liability on the mortgage, but also allowing the whole mort-
gage as a debt deduction to the estate. It has been suggested that a
reasonable solution to this problem would be to attribute to the wife
that portion of the value of the property which her proportionate
liability at the husband's death bears to the total purchase price of
59 But cf. Part II of this article, infra.6 0 Harvey v. United States, 185 F.2d 463 (7th Cir 1950) Drummond's
Estate v. Paschal, 75 F. Supp. 46 (D.C. Ark. 1947); Estate of Mary Louise
Selecman, 9 CCH TAx CT. MEm. 997 (1950). But see Hornor's Estate v.
Commissioner, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942) suggesting a contrary rule; Estate
of Nathalie Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650 (19455, acq., 1945 CuM. BULL. 4, where
this question was apparently ignored, to the taxpayer's benefit. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2040-1 (c) (5) (1958), indicates that income from the survivor's property
applied to the purchase of joint property will be considered a contribution by
the survivor despite a prior transfer of the income producing property from
the decedent to the survivor, but avoids specific mention of joint income pro-ducing property.61 Harvey v. United States, supra note 60; Estate of Mary Louise Selecman,
supra note 60; but cf. the suggestion to the contrary in Treas. Reg. q
20.2040-1(c)(4) (1958), speaking in terms of contribution of appreciated
property without reference to recognition or nonrecognition of the appreciation.6 2 Bremer v. Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148 (D.C.N.Y. 1933), noted in 48 HAIv L.
REv. 340 (1934), 44 YALE L.J. 687 (1935).
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the property, and to allow as a debt deduction only the proportion-
ate liability of the husband.63 Where the cost of the property and the
value at date of death are the same, this formula is acceptable, as the
estate should at least be allowed the total amount of the debt either
as a deduction or partly as an exclusion and partly as a deduction.64
However, where the estate tax value exceeds the cost, conceptual
problems are raised as to when the wife's contribution was made.
On the one hand it is inequitable to include the whole value of the
property in the husband's estate and allow only one-half the debt as
a deduction; on the other hand, it also seems inequitable to allow
one-half the debt as a deduction and an even larger exclusion based
on the ratio of the wife's liability to a value at date of death which
exceeds cost, where prior to the husband's death the wife has actually
contributed nothing.
5. Ownership. A final problem, which in practice merits first
consideration in this area, is the question of who is the real owner of
the property. The fact that record title is in the decedent and an-
other as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety may not be deter-
minative of the real ownership of the property, and the courts have
been willing to accept proof of such real ownership as governing the
estate tax results.65 Likewise, it may be shown that property osten-
sibly owned by one spouse is really jointly owned.66 Of course, in
63 Th is apparently the view expressed in Rudick, Property Owned in
Joint Tenancy and-Tenancy by the Entirety, in LAssmi, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES
190 (1955), although the alternatives raised by an estate tax value different
from the purchase price are not considered; 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G=sr
TAXAToI § 8.05 (1942 apparently criticizes the allowance of any contribu-
tion by the wife in this situation as tax avoidance; see case notes cited in note 62
supra. See also on this point Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1101, 1141 (1948).
64 A joint obligation is either deductible to the extent of one-half, or it is
fully deductible and the deduction is offset to the extent of one-half by includ-
ing the right of contribution or reimbursement against the co-obligor as an
asset of the estate. Parrott v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1929),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 870 (1929).
65 Estate of Elwood Mead, 1942 P-H B.T.A. Mamn. DEC. 42,286; Silver-
man v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1958) (government regulations on
issuance and payment of bonds held not to be determinative of true ownership).06 Brockway's Estate v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954)
(property held in name of wife was subject to a written agreement that it was
owned jointly with right of survivorship, so that it was includable in husband's
estate except to the extent of proved contributions by wife). In Old Colony
Trust Co., 39 B.T.A. 871 (1939), acq., 1989-2 Crum. BuLL. 27, the wife deeded
to her husband property inherited from her parents, and it was later deeded to
husband and wife as tenants by the entirety; the court held it to be her separate
property, not includable in the husband's estate, upon evidence that they had
always intended to convey the property to themselves as joint tenants. In Estate
of Harold W. Grant 1 T.C. 781 (1943), funds belonging to the husband were
deposited in a joint account, and were withdrawn by the wife just prior to his
death, while he was in a coma; it was held that in the absence of any agree-
ment betveen the parties as to the disposition of these funds, the joint tenancy
continued and the whole amount was includable in the husbands estate.
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determining the actual ownership of property, it will be nece-'ary to
refer to rules or presumptions of state law, and such local law will in
an appropriate case govern the tax results.67
As stated above with regard to the federal gift tax, questions of
ownership are more likely to arise in connection with personal than
with real property, primarily because of the formalities usually ob-
served in dealing with real property. Reference has already been
made to the frequency with which questions arise regarding owner-
ship of funds in joint bank accounts.68 Government bonds and other
securities are also susceptible to equivocal treatment by decedents,
and actual ownership may always be questioned.6 9
B. Estate tax problems arising from termination of joint tenancy;
other joint interests in property
An interesting set of problems is presented where property held
in joint tenancy, for which one co-owner has supplied all the con-
sideration, is transferred to the other owner, by both of them by gift
to others, or to a trust for their joint benefit. Assuming the usual
case where the parties are husband and wife and the former dies
first, if the joint tenancy were not terminated the whole property
would be taxed in the estate of the husband, as provided by law. If
just prior to the death of the husband, in an atmosphere implying a
contemplation-of-death motive, the parties terminate the tenancy,
altering in some respects their legal rights in the property, how much,
if any, of the property is includable in the husband's estate? The
simplest case involves conversion of the joint tenancy to a tenancy in
common between the husband and wife; although here there is no
statutory authority for inclusion of the whole property in the hus-
67Cf. Walter J. Reese, 25 B.T.A. 38 (1931), where husband and wife
entered into contracts for the sale of property held as tenants by the entireties,
and on the husband's death the Commissioner sought to include the whole of
the contracts in his estate; the court held that in the absence of proof to the
contrary, the presumption under state law (Michigan), to the effect that a con-
tract of sale of property held as tenants by the entireties, or the proceeds of sale
thereof, were held in the same manner, controlled; Merry M. Dennis, 26 B.T.A.
1120 (1932), acq., XII-1 Cum. BULL. 4 (1933), where the presumption of
New York law was applied, and mortgage bonds payable to the husband and
wife, received in exchange for property held by the entireties, were held to be
owned in common, and only one-half included in the husband's estate;
McCollum v. United States, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6170 (D.C. Okla. 1958),
where one-half was included in the husband's estate upon proof that property
held in joint tenancy was really community property.
68Note 27 supra; Estate of Harold W. Grant, 1 T.C. 731 (1943).
69 In Estate of John H. Boogher, 22 T.C. 1167 (1954), United States sav-
ings bonds which had been purchased by the decedent in his name and those
of various co-owners, in "or form, were held to be includable in the decedent's
estate for estate tax purposes in spite of the fact that all the bonds had been
delivered to the co-owners by the decedent. With regard to government bonds,
see Annot, 39 A.L.R.2d 698, 706 (1955).
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ban .& estate, the government has in several cases contended that
the whole property is includable under the section of the law taxing
transfers in contemplation of death.70 The courts have uniformly
held in this situation, however, that only one-half of the value of the
property is taxable in the husband's estate, either because he owned
only that portion of the property at his death, or because he could
have transferred no more than one-half in contemplation of death.71
The courts have taken a similar position where the husband and wife
make a joint gift of jointly held property to their children, where the
gift was made in contemplation of the husband's death.72 A transfer
of joint tenancy property to the wife should presumably bring about
the same result, but the few decisions bearing on the point are to the
contrary.73
A more complex question is presented where property held in
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety is transferred to a trust for
7 0 INT. 1Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.71 Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949) Steen
V. United States, 1951 P-H FED. TAx SEarv. 72,542 (D.C. Cal. 1951), aff'd
without reference to this point, 195 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 822 (1952); Baltimore National Bank v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 642
(D.C. Md. 1955); Estate of Edward Camall, 25 T.C. 654 (1955) acq., 1956-1
Cum. BuLL. 3. The Sullivan case contains the only extensive discussion of the
uestion, noting that if, on the one hand, the joint estate was merely terminated,
ere was no transfer, so there could be no "transfer in contemplation of death";
and, on the other hand, if the transaction involved a transfer, it was a bona fide
transfer for money's worth because the younger -wife's joint interest transferred
to the husband was worth at least as much as the husband's interest transferred
to her. In Baltimore National Bank and Carnall, supra, the terminated interests
were tenancies by the entirety; if the husbands in these cases were older than
the wives, then on actuarial principles they gained by the transaction.7 2 Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 71; Brockway's Estate v.
Commissioner, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954).7 3 Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 50 F. Supp. 949 (D.C. Pa. 1943),
aff'd per curiam, 137 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1943); Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C.
1059 (1943). In the former case the husband in 1924 transferred title to the
family residence from his name to his wife and himself as tenants by the en-
tirety, in 1932 transferred it to his wife alone; the 1932 transfer was held to be
in contemplation of death and the whole property was included in the husband's
estate. In Wilson, the transfer of the balance in a joint bank account to a sepa-
rate account in the wife's name, just prior to the husband's death, was held to
be a transfer in contemplation of death, and the entire account was apparently
included in the husband's estate. There is, however, a distinction between bank
deposits and other property in this respect, it being generally considered that
no gift is made of funds deposited in a joint account until the funds are with-
drawn by the co-owner (see Part I, supra). On the basis of this distinction, if
funds deposited by one of two co-owners of a joint account were transferred by
either to a third person in contemplation of the death of either, the whole
amount transferred should be included in the estate of the decedent. An
interesting case in this connection is Estate of Nathalie Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650
(1945), acq., 1945 Cmr. BULL. 4, where over a period of time property derived
from the husband was transferred to the wife, and subsequently, in 1941, to the
wife and husband as joint tenants; the wife died, and the Commissioner sought
to include the property in her estate on the ground that it was transferred to thejoint tenancy by her in contemplation of death, but the court held that the
transfer was not made in contemplation of death.
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the joint lives of the co-owners. The interests in property which are
transferred or created in such transactions may be includable in the
estate of a co-owner under the joint tenancy section of the law, un-
der the contemplation of death section, or as a transfer with retained
life estate, a transfer taking effect at death or a revocable transfer,
depending upon the circumstances and the interests transferred or
created.
In two cases a transfer of property held in tenancy by the en-
tirety to a revocable trust for the joint lives of the grantors has been
held not to affect materially the interests of the co-owners, and the
whole property has been included in the husband's estate under the
joint tenancy provision.74 However, in a similar case involving an
irrevocable trust, the Tax Court included only one-half of the prop-
erty, holding it taxable both as a transfer in contemplation of death
and as a transfer with a retained life estate.75 The internal revenue
service has taken the position that under these circumstances only
the life estate of the survivor in one-half of the property may be ex-
cluded from the decedents estate.76
C. Marital Deduction
As noted above, a deduction is allowed, within limits, for prop-
erty included in the gross estate which passes to the decedents
spouse. As in the case of the gift tax, the deduction is not available
where the interest in property passing to the spouse is a "terminable
interest". An ordinary joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety
between husband and wife will qualify for the marital deduction
because at the death of one the whole property passes to the sur-
vivor.77 However, if A, the husband, owns property in joint tenancy
74 Hornor's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942); Estate
of Frank N. Derby, 20 T.C. 164 (1953).
75 Estate of A. Carl Boner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955), acq., 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 4
(acq. limited; see Rev. Rul. 57-448, 1957-2 Cum. BrLL. 618). Another ap-
proach to this question in the case of a tenancy by the entirety might be to
include in the husband's estate the actuarially computed value of his interest
transferred to the trust, if in contemplation of death, or a value based on his
share of the income, if the retained life estate rationale is used.76 Rev. Rul. 57-448, supra note 75; the Ruling does not specify whether it
applies to both revocable and irrevocable trusts. An early case, Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Tait, 295 Fed. 429 (D.C. Md. 1923) held that separate transfers
by husband and wife to a joint irrevocable trust did not create a tenancy by the
entirety (then not taxable), but included the trust in the husband's estate none
the less.
7tNT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(e)(5), provides that survivorship
property shiall be considered as "passing from the decedent" to the spouse
within the requirements of the law, and presumably the interest passing which
so qualifies is limited to the part of the property includable in the decedent's
estate for estate tax purposes.
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with B, his wife, and C, then no part of the property will qualify for
the deduction in As estate because B's interest will terminate if C
survives her. Likewise, if A devises property to his wife and another
as joint tenants, the interest passing to the wife will not qualify be-
cause it may terminate if she predeceases the other owner.78
III. FEDmA INcomE TAX.
A. Taxation of income
The taxation of income from jointly held property depends upon
who is entitled to such income under appropriate state law. Gener-
ally, income from property held either as tenants in common, joint
tenants or tenants by the entirety belongs equally to each co-owner.
In some states, however, the husband has the right to receive all the
income from property held by the entirety and is, accordingly, tax-
able on the whole of such income.79
Under the income splitting provision in effect since 194880 it
usually makes no difference whether the husband or the wife receives
the income for income tax purposes. Thus if the joint owners of
income producing property are husband and wife, taxation of the
income only becomes important if they wish to file separate returns.
B. Basis problems
Ordinarily, property received by one person as the result of the
death of another acquires a new basis for federal income tax pur-
poses equal to the fair market value at the date of death of the dece-
dent.8 ' However, under the law in effect prior to 1954 this applied
only to property acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance, and
did not apply to property acquired, inter alia, by deed or contract
creating a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety. Thus, although
jointly held property was wholly included in the measure of the
estate tax, as now, except to the extent the survivor could prove con-
tribution to the purchase, no portion of the property acquired a new
basis by reason of the transfer at death.82 This rule is still in force
with regard to property acquired by survivorship where the co-
78 S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948-1 Cum. BurLL. 837.
79 See 2 MamRTNs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomm TAXAUON § 17.04 (1955);
I.T. 3878, 1947-2 Cuim. BuLL. 57. Problems of ownership of property or income
may be important here also. Cf. George K. Brennen, 4 T.C. 1260 (1945), acq.,
1945 Cu . BuLL. 2.80 INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2.
81Id. § 1014.
82 Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109 (1933).
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owner died prior to January 1, 1954.8s Accordingly, as to such prop-
erty, the basis for purposes of computing gain or depreciation is the
original cost to the co-owners at the time of acquisition, adjusted by
depreciation and other factors; no part of such property acquires a
new basis by reason of the death of a co-owner prior to January 1,
1954, no matter how much either party contributed to the purchase.
This rule is changed with regard to joint tenancy property in-
cluded in the estate of a co-owner dying after December 81, 1953.84
Such property acquires a new basis to the extent that it is included
in the gross estate of a co-owner for purposes of the federal estate
tax. However, this new basis may not be the fair market value at
the date of death. To the extent that the survivor acquired an in-
terest in the property before the death of the decedent, the basis
must be reduced by the survivor's share of depreciation, depletion,
etc., allowed prior to the decedent's death.85
For instance, if the husband supplied all the consideration for
the purchose of income producing property taken as joint tenants, the
whole property will be included in his estate, and the whole prop-
erty will acquire a new basis, the fair market value at his death;
however, the wife acquired a one-half interest in the property from
her husband prior to his death, and the new basis must be reduced
by her one-half share of any depreciation and other deductions al-
lowed for income tax purposes up to the date of the husband's death.
If the wife has supplied part of the consideration for purchase
of the property and a proportionate part of the property is excluded
from the husband's estate, the part excluded does not receive a new
basis as a result of the husband's death, and the wife continues to
use her original cost less depreciation with regard to such portion.
As for the portion of the property acquired by the wife by reason of
the death of the husband, she gets a new unadjusted basis, and as to
any portion acquired from the husband prior to his death, a new
basis adjusted for an allocable proportion of depreciation, as stated
above.88
8 3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014(b) (9); Faraco v. Commissioner, 261
F.2d 887 (,4th Cir. 1958).84 INr. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1014(b)(9).
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-6(a)(2) and (3), Ex. (2) (1957); Rev. Rul.
56-215, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 324, states that this rule applies even though no
estate tax return is required to be ified or no tax due, but that where no return
is required, the optional valuation date may not be elected.
86 See Treas. Reg. 1.1014-6(c) (1) (1957); Rev. Rul. 56-519, 1956-2 CuM.
BuLL. 123.
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IV. FEDMEaL TAX LIENS
This article is not an appropriate place for an extensive discus-
sion of federal tax liens.87 It is sufficient to say here that the lien
of the federal government for taxes due it is extensive and enjoys
high priority. It attaches generally to any property interest of the
taxpayer. Whether the lien will attach to jointly held property in
which the taxpayer has an interest depends upon the nature of the
taxpayer's interest in the property.
As the interest which each co-owner has in property held in
joint tenancy or tenancy in common amounts to his fractional un-
divided interest therein, the federal tax lien will reach this undivided
interest, but does not reach the interests of the other co-owners.88
However, it has generally been held that where, under state law,
property held in tenancy by the entirety is not subject to the separate
debts of either spouse, a federal lien for taxes owed separately by
either spouse will not attach to the property at all.89
It has been held that jointly owned property passing by sur-
vivorship to the cotenant cannot be subjected to the payment of
taxes owed by the decedent where the assessment is not made until
after his death, as he no longer has any interest in the property.90
87 INT. 11Ev. CODE OF 1954, § § 6321-6326. For discussion of federal tax
liens, see for instance, Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems,
13 TAx L. REV. 247, 459 (1958).8 United States v. Be gerly, 44 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1149 (D.C. Cal. 1952).
If the undivided interest oI the debtor is sold to satisfy the tax claim, such sale
will, of course, destroy the right of survivorship between the debtor and the
remaining cotenants, and the purchaser of such interest becomes a tenant in
common with the others.
89 United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951); Shaw v.
United States, 94 F. Supp. 245 (D.C. Mich. 1939); United States v. Nathanson,
60 F. Supp. 193 (D.C. Mich. 1945); Sulli v. United States, 1 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 1685 (D.C. Fla. 1958). In Schwartz v. United States, 191 F.2d 618 (4th
Cir. 1951), although the deed recited that the property was held by the entirety,
it was found that the husband and wife were not legally married, the estate of
tenancy by the entirety was therefore not created by the deed, and the hus-
band's one-half interest was subject to the lien. In United States v. American
National Bank, 255 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, Oct. 13, 1958, 3
L. Ed. 2d 72, the wife died and the entire estate held by the entireties, having
passed to the husband, was held subject to the tax lien. Cf. Bernstein v. United
States, 106 F. Supp. 238 (D.C. Mo. 1952), to the effect that the lien may
nevertheless attach to the separate income of the debtor from property held
by the entirety. If the liability for taxes is a joint liability of husband and wife,
there is no reason why the lien cannot reach property so held. Bernstein v
United States, supra.
90 rvine v. Helvering, 99 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1938); Fecarotta v. United
States, 154 F. Supp. 592 (D.C. Ariz. 1956). Property owned either in joint
tenancy or as tenants by the entirety is. however, subject to the lien for federal
estate taxes on the estate of a decease co-owner, but the extent to which the
lien will apply is not clear. INT. IEv. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a) (2); Rev. Rul.
56-144, 1956-1 Cum. Burro. 563.
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V. Wxsr VmGn-A INatrrANcE TAx
The West Virginia inheritance and transfer tax is imposed upon
transfers of property by will or by laws regulating descent and dis-
tribution, and upon certain other transfers set out in the statute.9 1
The tax is computed separately upon the value of property passing
to each beneficiary or transferee. 92 The law provides an exemption
of $15,000 for property passing to the spouse of a decedent, and
smaller exemptions for other close relatives.9 3
Undivided interests in property held in common are subject to
the tax just as other interests in property passing by will or descent.9 4
Property held jointly, with right of survivorship, is the subject
of a special subsection of the law.95 This provision, expressed in in-
credibly tortured form, is susceptible of a variety of interpretations.
The state tax commissioner has in fact over the years interpreted it
in a number of different ways in applying it to the taxation of prop-
erty held in joint tenancy. It is possible to argue that the whole,
one-half or no part of such property is subjected to tax under this
section. However, it is the current attitude of the tax commissioner
that the provision is similar in import to the federal law; that is, that
property held in joint tenancy is wholly includable in the estate of
the first co-owner to die, except to the extent that the survivor con-
tributed to the purchase price. There is language in the section
which may be read to support the exclusion of a proportionate part
of the property where the survivor has contributed to its purchase,
and it may be argued that the burden of proving contributions by the
survivor is not on the taxpayer here,96 as it is under the federal tax.
91W. Va. Code ch. 11, art. 11, § 1 (Michie 1955).
92 Id. ch. 11, art. 11, §§ 2-4. The tax, as implied by its title, is an inherit-
ance tax, as opposed to an estate tax; the latter is generally levied upon the total
value of all property passing from a decedent, whereas the former is measured
by the value of property passing to each beneficiary or transferee.
93 Id. ch. 11, art. 11, § 4. At the time this article goes to press (February
1959), bills are pending in both the Senate (Senate BI No. 89) and House of
Delegates (House Bill No. 99) of the West Virginia Legislature to increase
these exemptions.9 4 There is no court decision on the point, and the State Tax Commissioner
has never issued regulations interpreting the inheritance tax; however, there is
no substantial question about the taxation of undivided interests in property.
95W. VA. CODE, ch. 11, art. 11, § 1 (Michie 1955): "A tax .. , shall be
imposed upon the transfer, in trust, or otherwise, of any property, or interest
therein... if such transfer be... (d) by any person who shall transfer any
property which he owns, or shall cause any property to which he is absolutely
entitled to be transferred to or vested in himse and any other person jointly,
with the right of survivorship, in whole or in part, in such other person, a
transfer shall be deemed to occur and to be taxable under the provisions of
this article upon the vesting of such title in the survivor; ....96 Cf. Central Trust Co. v. State Tax Comm'r, 116 W. Va. 87, 178 S.E.
520 (1935); Ops. W. VA. Arry GEN., August 3, 1956.
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Another group of questions arises under the joint property sec-
tion from the language stating that the tax applies only where the
decedent "shall transfer any property which he owns, or shall cause
any property to which he is absolutely entitled to be transferred to
or vested in himself and any other person jointly". First it may be
asked what actions by the decedent will be held to "cause" prop-
erty to be transferred or vested. Does this mean that the decedent
must have been the instigator of the transaction in which the prop-
erty was transferred to himself and his co-tenant, or does it mean
that he must have paid the consideration for the transfer or vesting?
If the consideration test is not to be applied, property held in joint
tenancy will not be subject to the tax in any case where the survivor
initiated the transaction in which the property was acquired, re-
gardless of who paid the purchase price. Whichever interpretation
is valid, the tax apparently would not apply to property held in
joint tenancy where neither the decedent nor the survivor paid part
of the purchase price or caused the transfer; for instance, the tax
would not apply to property previously devised or given to A and B
as joint tenants, on the death of the first to die of A or B.
Another question of importance under this section is whether
the tax applies to property held in tenancy by the entirety. Inher-
itance tax statutes of some states contain specific exemptions for
property held in this manner, and others have been interpreted to
exclude property held by the entireties.97 It is doubtful whether the
language of the West Virginia statute, strictly construed, would ap-
ply to property held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.
This question makes it all more important to determine whether that
estate in property can be created in West Virginia.98
These questions lose some of their importance as a result of
a recent amendment to -the joint property section, which provides
that "not more than" one-half of property of which the decedent's
spouse is the co-owner, otherwise subject to the tax under the sec-
tion, shall be taxed.9 9 For instance, assuming that property held
97See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1101 (1948); CCH IhN., EsT. & GIrT TAx REsa.§ 1575 (1958).98 Merricks, supra note 2.
99 The statutory language, in the form of a proviso at the end of the joint
property section, note 95 supra, is as follows: "And provided further, that, in
the case of a surviving spouse, not more than fifty per centurn of the value of
any transfer mentioned in this subsection (d) shall be included and taxed in
any such decedent's estate." This proviso was added by W. Va. Acts 1957,
ch. 157, in effect 90 days after passage on March 5, 1957.
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by husband and wife as joint tenants would previously have been
wholly subject to the tax, under the new provision only one-half is
taxed. 7ere the surviving spouse has contributed to the purchase
of the property it is not clear under the statute what portion is to
be subject to the tax; if the survivor has contributed 4 of the total,
for instance, this new proviso might exclude . % or 3 of the total
value of the property. 100
A further proviso exempts up to $2,500 held in a joint bank
account or accounts in the name of the decedent and his spouse,
child, parent or descendant. 1° 1 The inter-relation of the joint bank
account exemption and the exclusion of one-half of property held
jointly by husband and wife is a typical problem of construction
under this article. It is understood that the present position of the
state tax commissioner is in favor of the taxpayer; the exclusion of
one-half of joint bank accounts of husband and wife is first applied,
and the $2,500 exemption is subtracted from the balance.
Another common inheritance tax problem in these days of joint
ownership is the taxation of jointly owned savings bonds. The
present position of the state tax commissioner is based upon an
opinion of the attorney general to the effect that United States
savings bonds in "A or B" form will ordinarily not be subject to
the tax under the joint property section, because there is no vesting
of title at the death of the first co-owner, but may in some cases
be taxable where purchased in contemplation of death. 02
100 The interpretation of the inheritance tax division is understood to be
that % of the total value of the property is first to be excluded under the proviso,
and the survivor's contribution is then subtracted from the balance, so that if
the survivor contributed % or more to the purchase, the whole property is
excluded.
'
0 1 The statutory language is in the form of a proviso in the joint property
section preceding that quoted in note 99, as follows: "Provided, however, that
this subsection shall not apply to bank accounts payable to the class desinated
in section two-a in a total amount of twenty-five hundred dollars or less.
102 Ops. W. VA. A-rr'y GEN., August 3, 1956, addressed to Richard E.
Bailey, Director-Attorney, Inheritance Tax Division. The opinion that "A or B"
bonds will not ordinarily be subject to tax under the joint property section is
based on a holding that the tax applies only in cases where title vests in the
survivor at the death of the first co-owner to die. But cf. Note, 59 W. VA. L.
REv. 342 (1957). The Attorney General's opinion takes the position that bonds
purchased by the decedent which are not to become the property of the surviv-
ing co-owner until the death of the purchaser are taxable as gifts in contempla-
tion of death. The failure of the Tax Commissioner to press collection of the
tax in this common situation may be attributable to the implication in the
Attorney General's opinion that the burden of proof is on the state. Bonds regis-
tered in "A, payable on death to B" form are presumably subject to tax at the
death of A.
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Many of the questions which occur in connection with the
application of the federal estate tax to jointly held property are also
potential inheritance tax problems. Additional questions may also
be raised under the inheritance tax statute because of its peculiar
nature.
An example may be cited in the area of creation and termina-
tion of joint tenancies in contemplation of death. The West Virginia
inheritance tax law contains a section purporting to tax transfers in
contemplation of death.103 Most of the examples discussed earlier
in connection with the federal estate tax in this area would logically
be resolved in similar fashion in computing the value of the property
subject to inheritance tax, as, for instance, a gift in contemplation
of the husband's death of joint tenancy property by husband and
wife to a third person. However, in the case where the husband, in
contemplation of death, conveys his separate property to himself
and his wife as joint tenants, the whole property would clearly be
subject to the federal estate tax, whether as jointly owned property
or as property transferred in contemplation of death, whereas the
application of the inheritance tax in this situation is impossible to
predict. It might be argued that the whole property is taxable as
a gift in contemplation of death; that half is taxable as a gift in
contemplation of death and half as jointly held property; or that a
maximum of one-half is taxable, as jointly held property, the other
half being excluded by law.10 4
Another complex of problems which may be of importance
in determining the inheritance tax are those relating to actual
ownership of property. Reference has already been made in con-
nection with the federal estate and gift taxes to the fact that per-
sonal property is particularly subject to informal treatment. 105 The
determination of the true owner may be especially important where
the exemptions for property owned jointly with the decedent's
spouse and for joint bank accounts are applicable. Problems of
ownership may also occur more frequently in estates which are too
small to be subject to the federal estate tax, but where the inheri-
tance tax is of considerable importance in proportion to the size
of the estate.
103W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art 11, § 1(c) (Michie 1955).
104 It is even possible to argue that the whole property is taxable as a gift
in contemplation of death and half taxable again as jointly owned property
passing to the wife; the counter argument is that the contemplation of death
and joint property sections are mutually exclusive, and that the property may
be taxed under one or the other of the sections, but not under both.
305 Parts I D and II A 5, supra, and particularly notes 27, 68 and 69 supra.
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A bothersome question of ownership results from the decision
in Lett v. Twentieth Street Bank,'06 which holds that bank accounts
in the names of two or more persons "in form to be paid to either"
are held in joint tenancy.107 It is not clear from the decision whether
there is a conclusive presumption that the full account passes to the
survivor, or whether it is still possible to prove, as it should be, that
the parties understood actual ownership of the funds to be otherwise.
The list of questions which may occur under the joint ownership
provision of the West Virginia inheritance tax law is almost endless,
as it is under many of the other sections of this law. Unfortunately,
there are few answers, and it is the opinion of most practitioners that
the only practical solution lies in the enactment of a completely new
law, preferably in the form of an estate tax. It does not seem prof-
itable to devote further discussion to these problems.108
CONCLUSION
It should be unnecessary to point out that devices of joint
ownership which involve survivor features do not serve to avoid
death taxes, and that they often create new and additional problems
for the survivor as well as for the estate of the first cotenant to die.
In short, joint ownership is a poor substitute for a will.
108 188 W. Va. 759 77 S.E.2d 818 (1953).
107 As the nature W a bank account differs considerably from that of real
property, it would certainly be impossible to fulfill all the common law require-
ments for the creation of a joint tenancy in a bank account, and it is difficult to
envision any of the common law attributes of the estate other than the right of
the survivor to take the whole. If the deposit of funds in an account of "A or B"
creates a joint tenancy, what rights do the joint tenants have in the funds during
their joint lives?
108 The attitude of the State Tax Commissioner towards some of these
questions almost ten years ago is stated in Koontz, West Virginia Inheritance
and Transfer Taxes, 28 TAxEs 669 (1950).
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